A risk neutral buyer observes a private signal s ∈ [a, b], which informs her that the mean and variance of a normally distributed risky asset are s and σ 2 s respectively. She then sets a price at which to acquire the asset owned by risk averse "outsiders". Assume σ 
Background
The assumption that agents possess private information is a feature of many economic models. Incentive compatibility is a basic requirement of any solution concept in such models. (See for example Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) .) Often, for reasons of tractability, these models represent private information as variables that can take on a continuum of values. There are then an uncountably infinite number of incentive compatibility constraints. One naturally wonders whether to insist on all of these being satisfied, or to allow for violations on a set of measure zero. Here, we present an economic example in which the equilibria differ markedly depending on which of these one chooses.
The phenomenon we illustrate can be ruled out by imposing suitable continuity of agents' actions with respect to their information. We do not see a strong economic rationale for such an assumption. We also contend that a suggestion to ignore anomalous behavior at a certain set of states just because they are of zero measure goes against the spirit of all known equilibrium concepts for extensive form games -where behavior at information sets that are reached with zero probability is vital. A more satisfactory resolution of this issue is important for interpreting equilibria in models with a continuum of types. Unfortunately, such an interpretation eludes us.
The Example
The trading environment is close to the one studied in Laffont and Maskin (1990) , the significant difference being the fact that there are a continuum of types. There are two players. Player B(uyer) has one unit of money and Player S(eller) has a unit endowment of an asset X whose future value is the realization of a random variableṼ . If Player S supplies q units of X to Player B at a unit price of ρ, their respective future wealths are the random variablesW
Both players only care about their future wealth. Player B is risk neutral and Player S is risk averse with u(x) = −e −x being her von NeumannMorgenstern utility function over wealth x. For some of the results it suffices that u(·) is strictly concave.
We study the following signaling game. Player B observes a signal s ∈ [a, b] that informs her thatṼ is distributed according to a normal distribution with mean s and variance σ 2 (s). She then acts as a Stackelberg leader and chooses a price at which she is willing to trade with Player S. Player S observes the price (but not the signal) and chooses how much of her endowment to sell. Thus, a strategy for Player B is a pricing function p : [a, b] −→ R + that specifies the price p(s) for each possible signal s ∈ [a, b]. A strategy for Player S is a mapping Q : R −→ [0, 1] which specifies the quantity Q(p) that she is willing to supply for any p ∈ R.
Assume that the signals are continuously distributed on [a, b] according to a probability distribution function F (·).
Given Q, the payoff of a type s Player B from setting a price ρ is the expectation ofW B , i.e.
Given a pricing strategy p, for each ρ ∈ R + , let G ρ (·|p) be a probability distribution on [a, b] that reflects the posterior beliefs of Player S regarding the distribution of signals. If Player B chooses the strategy p the payoff of Player S from choosing to supply q units of X having observed a price ρ is
Definition 1 (Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium). A strategy profile {p, Q} and a system of beliefs {G ρ (·|p)} ρ≥0 is said to constitute a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium if
1. For all ρ in the range of p, G ρ (·|p) obeys Bayes rule.
The first condition the usual restriction that the beliefs of Player S are consistent with Bayes rule along the equilibrium path. The remaining conditions require that traders' choices are optimal given their beliefs.
Assume E(u(Ṽ )|s) > 0 for all s so that Player S has no incentive to trade unless the price is positive. Player B, regardless of her type, can ensure a non-negative payoff and consequently p(s) ≤ s in any equilibrium.
Assume that σ 2 s ∈ 0, σ 2 and let
Before proceeding further, it is useful to introduce x(·, s) to denote the supply function of Player S when she knows s and σ 2 s = σ 2 . It can be seen 1 that
If σ 2 s = 0 and Player B knows s, the asset offers a sure return of s. As a result, the two assets are perfect substitutes if ρ = s. Otherwise, Player B strictly prefers the asset (bond) if ρ < s (ρ > s). Accordingly, her supply correspondence isx
Our findings are summarized as two propositions below. Their proofs of the above results are in Section 4.
Proposition 1. Suppose a − σ 2 > 0 and B = ∅. There exists a fully separating equilibrium in which a positive quantity is traded in every state.
Proposition 2. Suppose B = ∅. There is no trade in any separating equilibrium 2 .
Discussion
Several remarks with regard to Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 are in order.
Remark 1. Note that there are no assumptions on the cardinality of B (beyond it being non-empty). Therefore, one might change σ 2 b to zero from σ 2 > 0 and destroy a revealing equilibrium in which trade occurs. This is a change on a measure zero set.
Remark 2. It is not our claim that all separating equilibria are eliminated with the presence of a state s such that σ 2 s = ∅. Indeed, suppose Player B chooses the strategy p * where p * (s) = s − σ 2 . Since p * is strictly increasing, it will fully reveal the state. From x(·, s) andx(·, s) above, it is immediate that a best response for ρ ∈ a − σ 2 , b − σ 2 is to choose Q * (ρ) = 0. Assume that Player S believes the state to be a or b when ρ < a − σ 2 or ρ > b − σ 2 respectively. This constitutes a fully separating equilibrium 3 . However the fact that information is revealed is moot as there is never any trade in this equilibrium.
Remark 3. A rough intuition for the phenomenon is as follows. Trade occurs when a state is common-knowledge only because Player B is riskneutral and Player S is risk averse. However, when s ∈ B becomes commonknowledge there are no gains from trade, except at the no arbitrage price of p(s) = s. Now consider a s close to s and such that s / ∈ B. Incentive compatibility forces p(s ) to be close to s . The risk averse Player S must then seek full insurance and sell almost all her endowment to the Player B. It turns out that this feature implies that all types to the right of s will sell all their endowment. As the amount sold does not vary, the price paid does not either.
Remark 4. Suppose σ 2 s * = 0 but σ 2 s = 0 for s in a small neighborhood of s * . Then note that x(s * , s) = 1 − (s − s * − )/σ 2 in that neighborhood for sufficiently > 0. However, lim s→s * x(s * − , s) =x(s * − , s * ). The phenomenon described by Propositions 1 and 2 can be overcome if such discontinuity of the receiver's optimal action can be ruled out by assumption. (See Mailath (1987) ) However, we do not believe that such technical continuity restrictions can be an implication of behavioral hypotheses.
Remark 5. There is a discussion in Section 4.8 of Myerson (1991) on the sensitivity of sequential equilibria to the addition of chance moves of small probability. The example presented here seems to be of a different flavor although similar in spirit. Myerson's example consists of two states, say 3 That deviating to a price ρ ∈ [a − σ 2 , b − σ 2 ] does not benefit is clear. To check that deviation to a price outside this range also does not pay can be verified along the lines in the proof of Proposition 1.
1.1 and 2.2 to use his notation. Whether one considers 2.2 to be a zeroprobability event or an impossible event alters the behavior at 1.1, which of course occurs with probability one. It is harder to make such a distinction here. Here, every realization of the signal in [a, b] has zero probability. Therefore no single state is infinitely more likely than another.
Proofs
Given an equilibrium strategy profile {p, Q}, let q(s) = Q(p(s)) denote the equilibrium quantity that is traded in the eventS = s. Also let 1 + V (s , s) denote the payoff of a Player B of type s if she mimics the action of type s and v(s) = V (s, s). That is,
The incentive compatibility conditions for Player B can now be written as
Proof of Proposition 1. The proof is by construction. Consider the function g : (0, 0.5] −→ R where
Note that g (q) = σ 2 (1 − 2q)/q > 0 and hence g −1 is well defined. Moreover, g(0.5) = b and lim q→0 g(q) = −∞. Therefore, for any a < b, there exists q a > 0 such that g(a) = q a .
In the equilibrium we construct, a quantity q(s) = g −1 (s) will be traded in state s. Since Player S knows the state in equilibrium, the price p(s) that must be set to sustain a supply of q(s) must satisfy q(s) = x(p(s), s) which, by (5), gives
Our assumption that a − σ 2 > 0 ensures that p(s) > 0 for all s.
To construct the equilibrium then, take the beliefs {G ρ } ρ≥0 as follows: For any ρ ∈ [p(a), p(b)] the state is fully revealed and G ρ is the belief that s = p −1 (ρ) is the true state. For ρ ≥ p(b), assume that G ρ is the belief that the true state is b and for ρ ≤ p(a) that a is the true state. Given these beliefs, the equilibrium strategy of Player S is
We now claim that the strategy profile {p(·), Q(·)} together with the beliefs {G ρ } ρ≥0 constitute a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. It is evident from construction that Q(·) is optimal given the beliefs and that {G ρ } ρ≥0 is consistent with Bayes rule whenever applicable. The proof is complete upon checking that p(·) is optimal for Player B.
By choosing p(s), Player B of type s receives in equilibrium the payoff
The above achieves a global maximum at ρ * = (s + a)/2 − σ 2 /2 which lies to the right 4 of p(a). Therefore, the above is bounded above by 1 + (s − p(a))x(p(a), a) ≡ 1 + (s − p(a))q(a), which is precisely the payoff of Player B of type s should she pretend to be of type a and set the price p(a).
The above achieves a global maximum at ρ * * = (s + b)/2 − σ 2 /2, which lies to the left of p(b) = b − σ 2 /2. Therefore, for ρ ≥ p(b), the above is bounded above by 1
, which is precisely the payoff of type s if she pretends to be type b and sets a price of p(b).
The proof is complete if no type in [a, b] gains by mimicking the action of a another type. Given a q,q ∈ [q a , 0.5], let s = g −1 (x) and t = g −1 (x). The payoff of type s if she mimics the action of type t can be written as U (t, s) = 1 + (s − p(t))q(t)
The proof is complete if f (·, q) can be shown to have a global maximum at q, for each q ∈ [q a , 0.5]. This follows immediately since ∂f (x, q) ∂x = (g(q) − g(x)) − xg (x) + σ 2 (1 − 2x) = g(q) − g(x) ∂ 2 f (x, q) ∂x 2 = −g (x) < 0 4 Simple algebra immediately yields ρ * − p(a) = (s−a) 2 + σ 2 (0.5 − qa) > 0.
From the previous Lemma, σ 2 s > 0 for all s > s * . Therefore, everywhere to the right of s * , one must have q(s) = 1 − (1 − p(s))/σ 2 (7)
Taking liminf on both sides, we note that q + = 1. By the monotonicity of q(·), we must have q(s) = 1 for all s.
Proof of Proposition 2. Lemmas 2 and 3 readily imply that there is no trade in any state in any fully separating equilibrium.
